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Organizational Apologies: BP as a
Case Study
Erin O'Hara O'Connor 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1959 (2011)
This Article examines the conduct of BP executives in the
weeks following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to illuminate
the use of apology by organizations. After briefly describing the
value of apology and its nuances from an evolutionary
perspective, the Article describes how apology and other
responsibility-accepting behaviors can be mobilized by
organizations to avoid the costs of its apparently careless
conduct. In particular, organizations can designate particular
agents as spokespersons who possess the ability to portray a
sense of sincerity and regret. Moreover, reconciliation by
ingroup members appears to be more common than is
reconciliation by outgroup members, likely because the value of
a future relationship is higher for ingroup members. In
response to an event that harms others, an organization should
designate spokespersons that resemble the victims and the
victims' allies as much as possible. BP executives did a good
job of responding promptly, accepting responsibility, pledging
to repair the harm, and, at least initially, credibly conveying
regret. However, BP's CEO eventually expressed weariness for
the role of transgressor, an act that exacerbated the firm's
public relations problems. The fact that BP executives were
from other nations and were clearly members of a different
social class from most of the victims tainted public perceptions
of the executives' comments. BP's public relations blunders
suggest a need for further study of the effect of
ingroup/outgroup perceptions on the impact of apology and
subsequent liabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, the Macondo oil well ruptured during the
final phases of exploratory drilling.1  Methane gas and other
substances spewed from the well onto the Deepwater Horizon drilling
platform causing an explosion and fire that killed eleven crewmen 2
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Special thanks to Byron Talmadge
Infmger IV and Max Sills for valuable research assistance and to Mark Cohen, Andy Daughety,
Jennifer Reinganum, and participants at the Rigs, Risk, and Responsibility: Conference on the
BP Oil Spill at Vanderbilt University Law School for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2010, httpJ/www.nytimes.con/2010/O4/22/us/22rig.html?ref=gulfofmexico20lo.
2. See Ed Crooks & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Cultural Failings Leave BP Engulfed, FIN.
TIMES, June 8, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dea66a94-7327-lldf-ae73-00144feabdcO.html#
axzzlRwGN4Dnd.; Noaki Schwartz & Harry R Weber, Methane Gas Bubble Triggered Deadly
Oil Rig Explosion, Workers Say, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.), May 8, 2010,
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20100508/ARTICLE/5081048/2416.
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and ultimately sank the platform.3 Over the next three months, the
well, located approximately 250 miles southeast of Houston, Texas,
4
spilled as much as 184 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.
5
In the aftermath, the U.S. government banned deepwater drilling for
several months6 while applicable regulations were toughened.
7
The well's majority owner was BP PLC, formerly known as the
British Petroleum Company.8 Since the spill, BP has paid out as much
as $60 billion in cleanup costs and in reimbursements for the lost
livelihoods of people and companies on the Gulf Coast.9 In addition,
BP's stock price plummeted to a fourteen-year low--slashing the
company's pre-crisis market value by half.10 Public opinion of BP1' and
employee morale also plummeted, the latter creating a risk that many
3. See Jessica Resnick-Ault & Katarzyna Klimasinka, Transocean Rig Sinks in Gulf of
Mexico as Coast Guard Looks for Survivor, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.
bloomberg.co mnnews/2010- 04-22/transoce an-rig- sinks-in- gulf-of-mexico-following-blaze -coast-
guard-says.html.
4. See Rowena Mason, BP's 35,00Oft Well Could Produce 3bn Barrels of Oil, TELEGRAPH
(London), Sept. 2, 2009, httpJ/www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/6128323/BPs-
35000ft-well-could-produce-3bn-barrels-of-oil.html.
5. See Vivienne Walt, Can BP Ever Rebuild Its Reputation?, TIME, July 19, 2010,
http://www.time.com/timefbusinesstarticle/0,8599,2004701,00.html.
6. See Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive to Guide Safe, Six-
Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 30, 2010), available at httpJ/www.doi.gov/
news/pressrele ase s/Interior-Issue s-Directive-to-Guide- Safe -Six-Month-Moratorium-onDeepwater
-Drilling.cfm.
7. See Nicholas Johnston & Hans Nichols, New Offshore Oil Drilling Must Have
Safeguards, Obama Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
04- 30/new-offshore-oil-drilling- must-have-safeguards-obama- says.html. For example, oil
companies now must prove their ability to contain oil spills occurring in deep water before being
granted new drilling permits. Marian Wang, Eirst Deepwater Drilling Permit Since BP Spill Goes
to ... a Well Co-Owned by BP, PROPUBLICABLOG (Mar. 1, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://www.propublica
.org/blog/ite m/first -deepwater-driling- permit-since-bp-spill-goe s-to-a-well-co-owned-by-b.
8. Marie Neptune & Jay Ruskin, One-fourth Owner of Macondo Well 'Shocked' at BP's
'Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct,' UNITED FOR PEACE OF PIERCE COUNTY (June 19, 2010),
available at http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/9744-news-one-fourth-owner-
of- macondo -well-shocke d-at-bps-gros s-negligence-or-Willful- misconduct.html.
9. See Walt, supra note 5; see also GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 19, available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported-
pdfs/library/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf (noting that the compensation fund, paid into by BP, will cover
claims for lost earnings and lost profits).
10. See Ayesha Rascoe & Tom Doggett, BP Shares Plunge as U.S. Threatens New Penalties,
REUTERS, June 9, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/09/us-oil-spill-
idUSTRE6573FD20100609.
11. Mark Murray, Poll: Spill Drags the President's Ratings Down, MSNBC.COM, June 23,
2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37881749 (providing results of June 2010 NBC News
Journal poll, where respondents gave BP only a 6% favorable rating, compared historically to a
3% favorable rating given to Saddam Hussein and an 11% favorable rating for O.J. Simpson).
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employees would seek jobs elsewhere. 12 In addition to the drilling ban,
Congress appropriated several million dollars to increase federal
inspection and monitoring of drilling operations. 13 In its most recent
annual report, BP states that it may face additional U.S. regulations
that would increase its costs of regulatory compliance and decrease its
ability to pursue new exploration.14 That report also identifies
reputational damage making it more difficult for BP to secure
investment opportunities from other governments. 15 Thus, as a result
of this explosion, BP has incurred substantial liabilities, has
diminished its human capital, and has increased its regulatory
burdens.
This Article argues that BP could have prevented some portion
of these losses through more effective public relations ("PR"). In
particular, despite remarkable efforts to express regret and to take
full responsibility for the damage caused by the rupture and spill, BP
created the impression that its statements were insincere through a
series of public images and comments that dampened and
counteracted the effectiveness of its apologies. Recent experimental
studies show that we ascribe more positive behaviors and motives to
ingroup members than to outgroup members. This Article posits that
BP harmed itself through its public appearances and statements by
enhancing the degree to which members of the public viewed the
company as outside their socioeconomic and national group (as well as
the group of individuals and organizations that share their basic
values). BP's situation suggests that the effect of ingroup and
outgroup triggers on apology, liability, and regulation warrants more
study.
Part II identifies an evolutionary approach to apology. 16
Conciliatory efforts can be seen as a way to economize punishment
12. See Graham Hales, The BP Brand One Year Later: Branding Lessons FRom the Disaster,
INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/Libraries/Articles/BPOneYearOn_2
.sflb.ashx (last visited July 15, 2011); Eve Tahmincioglu, Surviving Your Company's Mistakes:
Corporate Crises Such as BP, Toyota and elsewhere Impact Employees, MSNBC.COM, May 17,
2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37108260/ns/business-personal financetsurviving-your-
companys-mistakes/; BP Reviews, GLASSDOOR.COM, http://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/BP-
Reviews-E9011.htm (anonymous employee post on August 31, 2011 stating that employee morale
remains low after oil spill).
13. See Michael R. Bromwich, Criticizing the Inspectors, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010,
4:54 PM), http:l/www. whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/03/criticizing-inspectors.




16. I've written on this topic before. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology and Thick Trust What
Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHi.-KENT L REV. 1055
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costs in the face of defection. Viewing apology from an evolutionary
perspective generates insight into many apology practices, including
the very careful scrutiny of apologies, the similarities in audience
reception between individual and organizational apologies, the
consequent advantage that organizations can garner when proffering
apologies, and the role that ingroup and outgroup biases can play in
the success or failure of apologies.
Part III turns to BP's public relations statements and situates
these communications in apology discourse, including the acceptance
of responsibility, expression of remorse, and offer of repair. This Part
then contrasts BP's executive conduct with Exxon's executive conduct
following the Exxon Valdez oil-tanker spill to show that, although BP
avoided some of the Exxon executives' PR mistakes, BP made other
costly mistakes. In addition to providing PR lessons for the future,
BP's mistakes suggest fruitful avenues for further research regarding
apologies and their connection to liability and regulation. Part IV
concludes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF APOLOGY
A. Punishing Cheaters, to a Point
Humans are a social species. Throughout our history, we've
banded together in groups to hunt, to repel predators, to raise
families, and to brave inhospitable climates. Indeed, there is no
evidence that humans ever lived in isolation.17 Over time, small,
mostly kin-based groups expanded into vast numbers of overlapping,
sometimes large cooperative networks that include nonkin and even
strangers. Often this cooperative behavior involves an individual
conferring a benefit on another at some cost to herself with no
expectation of an immediate return benefit. Evolutionary theorists
refer to this phenomenon as reciprocal altruism. 18
Because return cooperation comes later, a noncooperator can
exploit a cooperative network by joining it for long enough to reap
benefits but not actually providing return benefits to the group. John
Maynard Smith and George Price illustrated this problem with their
(2004); Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121
(2002).
17. Group living is a feature common to most primates. William A. Mason & Sally P.
Mendoza, Primate Social Conflict: An Overview of Sources, Forms and Consequences, in PRIMATE
SOCIAL CONFLICT 1, 1 (William A. Mason & Sally P. Mendoza eds., 1993).
18. Robert Trivers is credited with coining the term in Robert Trivers, The Evolution of
Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 35 (1971).
1962 [Vol. 64:6:1959
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Hawk-Dove Game. In the game, individuals in a population are either
Doves, who are passive cooperators, or Hawks, who are aggressive
noncooperators. As the game plays out over time, Hawks exploit Doves
and eventually drive them out of the population. The best strategy for
a Dove is to act like a Dove when encountering other Doves but to act
like a Hawk when encountering Hawks.19
Robert Axelrod's well-known computer tournament, which
tested the relative success of strategies submitted by academics from a
variety of disciplines for use in an iterated two-player Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, bore out a similar lesson. The most successful
strategy, submitted by a psychologist, was "tit-for-tat," defined as
cooperating in the first round and then mirroring the other player's
behavior in the previous round. Thus, if the other player cooperated in
the previous round, the tit-for-tat strategy returned cooperation with
cooperation. If instead the other player defected in the previous round,
tit-for-tat returned defection with defection. 20 Axelrod attributed tit-
for-tat's success to its robust combination of niceness, retaliation,
forgiveness, and clarity: "Its niceness prevents it from getting into
unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from
persisting whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore
mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other
player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation."
21
Successful social interactions tend to mirror these basic
features. In Prisoner's Dilemma situations, game theory often focuses
on detecting and punishing defection by the other player. In their
simplest form, optimal strategies set the punishment costs high
enough to deter defections, factoring in the probability of actually
detecting a defection. In real life, however, defections can occur
regardless of the threatened sanctions. People fail to abide by
cooperative norms for many reasons, including some combination of
oversight, accident, misunderstanding, cruelty, laziness, selfishness,
or indifference. 22 Maximal punishment is often not the best response
to transgression; after all, it is costly to the punisher, it is not
warranted in all situations where others fail to comply with
cooperative norms, and it inevitably fails to deter some nonpurposeful
transgressions. Threatened punishment, including social ostracism,
reputational damage, and liability, best deters failure to comply with
19. See J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 15
(1973) (describing a more detailed variant of the Hawk-Dove Game); see also J. Maynard Smith,
Optimization Theory in Evolution, 9 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY& SYSTEMATICS 31, 48-52 (1978).
20. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 30-31 (1984).
21. Id. at 54.
22. O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1156.
19632011]
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cooperative norms. But in reality, punishment costs are conserved and
future cooperation is enhanced by allowing a reduction or cessation of
at least some punishment forms when the transgressor credibly
pledges future compliance with the cooperative norms. The optimal
strategy, like tit-for-tat, is retaliatory and yet discriminately forgiving.
B. The Value of Apology (and Other Reparative Discourse)
Humans often de-escalate conflicts with conciliatory gestures,
and evidence indicates that other highly evolved social species also use
conciliatory gestures.23 For example, consider noted ethologist Frans
de Waal's description of conflict resolution among chimpanzees:
I first realized that this subject can be studied in other species after witnessing a fight
in the chimpanzee colony of the Arnhem Zoo in the Netherlands. It was the winter of
1975 and the colony was kept indoors. In the course of a charging display, the dominant
male attacked a female, which caused screaming chaos as other chimpanzees came to
her defense. When the group finally calmed down, an unusual silence followed, with
nobody moving, as if the apes were waiting for something. Suddenly the entire colony
burst out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in the corner of the
hall. In the midst of the pandemonium I saw two chimpanzees kiss and embrace.
... [T]he embracing individuals had been the same male and female of the initial fight.
When the word 'reconciliation' popped into my mind, it immediately illuminated the
connection. From that day on I noticed that emotional reunions between aggressors and
victims were quite common. The phenomenon became so obvious that it was hard to
imagine that it had been overlooked for so long by me and by scores of other
ethologists.
2 4
There is no doubt that culture significantly shapes
reconciliation behaviors,25 but de Waal argues the phenomenon's roots
go much deeper:
23. See generally Frans de Waal, Reconciliation Among Primates: A Review of Empirical
Evidence and Theoretical Issues, in PRIMATE SOCIAL CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 111 (arguing
that increased contact and appeasing behavior in primates after conflict suggests social
reconciliation); Frans B.M. de Waal & RenMei Ren, Comparison of the Reconciliation Behavior of
Stumptail and Rhesus Macaques, 78 ETHOLOGY 129, 130-31 (1988) (describing reconciliation
studies of several primate species); Frans B.M. de Waal & Angeline van Roosmalen,
Reconciliation and Consolation Among Chimpanzees, 5 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 55, 55
(1979) (discussing postconflict reconciliation behavior among chimpanzees); Frans B.M. de Waal
& Deborah Yoshihara, Reconciliation and Redirected Affection in Rhesus Monkeys, 85
BEHAVIOUR 224, 239-40 (1983) (summarizing an empirical study of chimpanzee conciliatory
behavior); Karolina Westlun et al., Post-Conflict Affiliation in Common Marmosets, 52 AM. J.
PRIMATOLOGY 31, 44 (2000) (explaining reconciliation through postconflict affiliation in
marmosets); Allison D. York & T.E. Rowell, Reconciliation Following Aggression in Patas
Monkeys, Erythrocebus Patas, 36 ANIMAL BEHAV. 502, 507-08 (1988) (comparing reconciliation
in patas monkeys with that of other primates).
24. FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 5 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Letitia Hickson, The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-
Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 283, 283 (1986) (conducting a cross cultural study of apology);
Michael C. Luebbert, The Survival Value of Forgiveness, in EVOLUTION OF THE PSYCHE 169, 185
1964
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Forgiveness is not, as some people seem to believe, a mysterious and sublime idea that
we owe to a few millennia of Judeo-Christianity. It did not originate in the minds of
people .... The fact that monkeys, apes, and humans all engage in reconciliation
behavior means that it is probably over thirty million years old. . . . [R]econciliation
behavior must be seen as a shared heritage of the primate order. Our species has many
conciliatory gestures and contact patterns in common with the apes (stretching out a
hand, smiling, kissing, embracing, and so on).... Language and culture merely add a
degree of subtlety and variation to human peacemaking strategies.
2 6
Reconciliation among both humans and other primates often
involves one party to the conflict placing itself in a position of clear
powerlessness relative to the other 27 and performing an act that
represents a plea for future conflict to subside. 28 Among humans, such
gestures often take the form of apology.
When effective, apologies can almost instantaneously erode the
anger and pain associated with transgressions. While there is
disagreement among sociologists, psychologists, moral philosophers,
and others regarding the elements of effective apologies (those likely
to elicit reconciliation), four features seem to be either express or
implied in most effective apologies: the identification of a wrongful
act,29 an expression of remorse, 30 a promise to forbear future
transgressions, 31 and an offer to repair the damage in some way.
32
(David H. Rosen & Michael C. Luebbert eds., 1999) (arguing that the concept of forgiveness can
have different meanings in shame and guilt-based cultures); Harry C. Triandis, Individualism
and Collectivism: Past, Present, and Future, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 35, 39
(David Matsumoto ed., 2001) (arguing that apologies and the language of reconciliation differ
depending on whether a culture is individualist or collectivist); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 461, 461 (1986) (comparing apologyin Japan and the United States).
26. DE WAAL, supra note 24, at 270-71.
27. See NICHOLAS TAVUCI-flS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION
35 (1991) (discussing the power of the victim in the aftermath of apology in that "the victim alone.
holds the keys of redemption and reconciliation"); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 28 (1988) (discussing the moral ritual of apology where a transgressor
lowers himself to beg for forgiveness).
28. De Waal, for example, offers a drawing reproducing a scene where a transgressor gets
too close to a mother's infant, causing the mother to hit her. The transgressor initially retreats to
safety but then returns to the mother and places her face very close to the mother while yelping.
The mother could have attacked again but instead plants a kiss on the nose of the transgressor.
Frans B.M. de Waal, The First Kiss: Foundations of Conflict Resolution Research in Animals, in
NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15, 18 fig.2.1 (Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. de Waal eds., 2000).
29. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1133-34 (discussing examples of unsuccessful
apologies due to the transgressor's reluctance to make clear the nature of his wrong).
30. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1014-15
(1999) (expression of regret essential element of apology); Deborah Tannen, I'm Sorry, I Won't
Apologize, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 21, 1996, at 34 (providing advice for effective apologies and
stating that "the depth of remorse should be commensurate with the significance of the offense').
31. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 25, at 469.
32. Id. For a fuller discussion of these elements and the interdisciplinary literature on
apology, see O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1131-39.
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These elements serve many functions; the first three elements
together confirm the validity of a shared norm of cooperation.
33
Despite the transgression, everyone agrees that the offending behavior
was unsatisfactory. The transgressor's offer of repair shows that the
transgressor wishes to relieve the victim of at least some of the harm
that the victim suffered.
Effective apologies can reopen the door to future mutually
beneficial exchanges. They can also relieve the transgressor of some of
the liability associated with the transgression. For example, victims
who participate in victim-offender mediation ('VOM') often receive a
heartfelt apology from their offenders, 34 and, as a result, many are
better able to let go of hate and anger. 35 VOM is a growing substitute
for the criminal justice system and is used primarily for low-level
property crimes committed by first-time (often juvenile) offenders.36 In
VOM, victims and offenders meet in the presence of a mediator to
discuss the crime and its impact on the victim, and, if the victim
wishes, the charges can be dropped after the completion of VOM.
About eighty to ninety percent of participants report high levels of
satisfaction with VOM,37 and the apology often proves more valuable
to the victim than either punishment or compensation.
38
In the context of civil law, apology can help to both settle the
dispute and reduce the ultimate amount of liability. In a survey of
members of the State Bar of Georgia conducted by Douglas Yarn,
eighty-three percent of responding lawyers agreed that apology alone
33. Cf. TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 14 (apologies "commemorate and reproduce ethical
axioms').
34. See Erin Ann O'Hara & Maria May Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both
Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204-05 (2009) (noting that victims
participate in VOM in part to receive an apology and offenders participate in part to proffer one).
35. MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., CTI FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & PEACEMAKING, VICTIM-
OFFENDER DIALOGUE IN CRIMES AND SEVERE VIOLENCE, A MULTI-SITE STUDY OF PROGRAMS IN
TEXAS AND OHIO 13 (2002), available at http://www.cehd.umn.edulssw/rjp/resourcest
rj-dialoguejresourcesVSOD_SevereViolenceExecSumTXOHVODCSV.pdf.
36. O'Hara & Robbins, supra note 34, at 203 (citing studies).
37. Mark S. Umbreit et al., The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation" Two Decades of
Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 30 (2001).
38. See O'Hara & Robbins, supra note 34, at 211 ("Victims often walk into mediation hoping
to force the offender to accept a punishment. They very often also present demands for
reparations. At the end of the VOM process, however, what victims really value is the apology,
the expression of remorse, and the understanding that only the VOM process could have
provided them."); see also Kimberly N. Grant, Ten Dollars for Twenty-Four Years, DISP. RESOL
MAG., Fall 2008, at 19, 21 ("Overall, victim-offender mediation holds promise to restore justice at
a much deeper level than even the most generous compensation from the state.").
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could settle many disputes.3 9 In an experiment conducted by Russell
Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, tenants were more likely to accept a
settlement offer from their landlord when it was accompanied by an
apology. 40 Jennifer Robbennolt also conducted experiments where she
asked subjects to imagine that they had been hurt in an accident and
then report on their willingness to accept a settlement offer that
covered their out-of-pocket expenses but no more. She found that
subjects were more willing to accept the settlement offer when they
were told that the transgressor had apologized for causing the harm. 41
Additionally, several hospitals that have recently adopted policies in
which they disclose medical errors and apologize to patients following
such incidents report significantly reduced litigation and liability
costs.42
Although apology can be a very useful tool for reducing
hostilities, economizing on punishment costs, and promoting future
cooperation, it can also be exploited by Hawk defectors who feign a
commitment to Dove-like cooperation. As Ambrose Bierce once
cynically quipped, apology can "lay the foundation for a future
offense."43 For apology to serve as a valuable reconciliation device,
then, victims need some ability to discriminate between sincere and
insincere apologies. 44 In general, humans are surprisingly good at
detecting cheating behavior in others.45 In fact, studies indicate that
39. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1125 n.14 (citing Douglas Yarn, Survey of
Lawyers' Attitudes Toward ADR, conducted on behalf of the Georgia Supreme Court's
Commissions on Dispute Resolution and Professionalism (on file with author)).
40. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 148 (1994).
41. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 482-89 (2003). Robbennolt also found that "partial" apologies (those in
which the transgressor was guarded and failed to identify the wrongful act) sometimes reduced
the subjects' willingness to settle relative to subjects who were given no apology information. Id.
at 486.
42. See, e.g., Richard C. Boothman et aL., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims?
The University of Michigan Experience, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Jan. 2009, at 125, 142-44
(University of Michigan Health System's litigation costs dropped by half after instating an open
and honest response to patient complaints, which frequently included an apology); Jonathan R.
Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Malpractice, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1451-54, 1457 (2000) (a VA hospital in Kentucky experienced lower
costs after instituting policy of following up with patients and apologizing after discovering an
error).
43. TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 7 (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 12
(1958)).
44. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1160 ("Generous forgivers who can discern sincere
from insincere apologies have an advantage over both uniformly generous and stingy forgivers.').
45. Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How
Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187, 196-97, 259-60
(1989).
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lay people can detect deception at rates significantly higher than those
attributable to chance.
46
The absence of one or more of the elements of an effective
apology often indicates such a lack of sincerity. Consider, for example,
Senator Bob Packwood's apology made after several women accused
him of sexual harassment during his time in office: "I'm apologizing
for the conduct that it was alleged I did."47 By failing to identify a
specific wrongful act, Packwood failed to take ownership of any
wrongful action, and his apology therefore seemed strategic.
48
Consider also Reverend Jerry Falwell's apology after receiving
criticism for stating that the Antichrist was alive and was a Jewish
man. Although he apologized for his lack of "tact" and "judgment,"
Falwell stated, "I apologize not for what I believe." 49 Falwell was
sincere in his statements. Indeed, he might have believed he was
acting out of integrity when he refused to suggest that he believed
otherwise. But he did not appear to seek forgiveness for violating a
shared sense of values or cooperative norms. Instead, Falwell seemed
46. Bella DePaulo et al., Humans as Lie Detectors, J. COMM., Spring 1980, at 129, 130. See
generally Linda Mealey et al., Enhanced Memory for Faces of Cheaters, 17 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 119 (1996) (experimental results showing greater attention to and memory
storage for people's faces when accompanied by information that the people have a history of
cheating); Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, in 14
ADVANCFs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1981) (arguing that
evolution selects for lie detection and describing lie-detection behavior).
47. Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead, Say You're Sorry, 28 PSYCHOL. 'TDAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 40,
76, 78.
48. Id. It is not entirely clear just how specific a transgressor needs to be, however, and the
answer may turn on the context. As a contrast to the Packwood statements, consider those of
then gubernatorial candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger in response to allegations that he had
engaged in sexual harassment:
So I want to say to you, yes, that I have behaved badly sometimes. Yes, it is true that I
was on rowdy movie sets and I have done things that were not right which I thought
then was playful but now I recognize that I have offended people. And to those people
that I have offended, I want to say to them I am deeply sorry about that and I apologize
because this is not what I'm trying to do. When I'm governor, I want to prove to the
women that I will be a champion for the women, a champion for the women. And I hope
that you will give me the chance to prove that.
Text of Arnold Schwarzenegger Apology, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2003, http://www.usa
today.comlnews/politicselectionsastate/2003- 10-02-arnold-text_x.htm. This apology does not
identify a specific person or date or even specific acts, yet it did not stop Californians from
electing Schwarzenegger. Although this apology is slightly more specific than Packwood's was,
the difference might be that Packwood was accused of sexual harassment while serving in public
office, whereas Schwarzenegger was accused of sexual harassment in Hollywood. Presumably, an
effective public apology is more essential in cases where the wrongdoing occurred while serving
in a job paid for with taxpayer dollars.





to insist that the community respect his beliefs even though many
people found them insulting. In this sense, Falwell appeared to seek
forgiveness without expressing remorse for the offense. To the extent
that Falwell sought to resurrect the respect of those offended by his
beliefs, his apology failed due to its insincere or strategic nature.
In addition, sometimes apologies fail to express remorse
effectively because they include argumentative language. When a
spouse says, "I'm sorry that I didn't mow the lawn, but I wanted to
watch the game," for example, it seems that the transgressor is not
remorseful for failing to mow the lawn. Instead, it appears that the
spouse is attempting to justify the course of conduct as reasonable.
People rarely perceive the phrase "I'm sorry but.. ." as sincere.
50
People also tend to scrutinize apologies for more subtle
indicators of sincerity. Context is important when determining the
requisite timing, form, elaborateness, and word choice for an effective
apology as recipients of apologies often scrutinize these for
appropriateness. Nonverbal cues are also scrutinized, including eye
contact, breathing, body posture, facial complexion, facial expressions,
tone of voice, and pace of speech.51 Even small children focus on cues
that indicate sincere remorse and are more likely to accept apologies
when they think that the transgressor is remorseful.
52
With our apologies, we may hope to resurrect our reputations
and thereby avoid ostracism or other punishment. Apologies can risk
producing the opposite result, though, revealing damning information
about the transgressor and leading to further reputational loss and
ostracism. Truly effective apologies appear to transcend these
functional concerns, however, because their nuances (timing, word
choice, complexion, body language, and the like) suggest that
emotional forces (like guilt and an honest desire to fix the problem)
compel them. In his well-known book, Passions Within Reason, Robert
Frank discusses the importance of such cues for interpreting the
50. See Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L REV. 1165, 1173
(1997) (discussing the use of explanation apologies); Amy J. Stephson, Law Means Never Having
To Say You're Sorry . . .Or Does It?, KING COUNTY B. BULL. (July 2011),
http://www.amystephsoncom/docs/KCBAJul2011AmyStephson.pdf (describing "I'm sorry, but I
." apologies as bad apologies).
51. O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 16, at 1139-40; see Robert N. Strassfield, Robert McNamara
and the Art and Law of Confession: "A Simple Desultory Philippic (or How I was Robert
McNamara'd Into Submission)," 47 DUKE L.J. 491, 516 (1997) (noting that judges rely on
defendant demeanor to assess sincerity of remorse in sentencing); cf. ROBERT H. FRAN,
PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 125-31 (1988) (discussing
interpretational clues to sincerity of emotional expression).
52. Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of
the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 353-55 (1989).
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sincerity of conduct. 53 The idea is that we reap greater benefits by
associating with people who do the right thing because of a strong
emotional commitment to do good for its own sake than we do from
associating with those who do the right thing only because it benefits
them in some way. Frank forcefully argues that the nuances of
behavior represent subconscious clues to an individual's emotional
commitments; 54 in short, although imperfect, they help us sort Hawks
from Doves. Those cues can be particularly important once a person
has acted in a Hawkish manner.
Thus, a person who apologizes primarily out of emotional need
is likely to fare better than a person who apologizes purely for
strategic reasons. The key to that success, however, lies precisely in
the fact that the former person is not acting in order to obtain the
gain.
What about forgivers? Are people who forgive out of an
emotional need or sense of religious or social obligation made better off
than those who forgive purely as a consequence of rational
calculation? Recall that Axelrod attributed the success of the tit-for-tat
strategy to a combination of its retaliation and its generous
forgiveness.5 5 In the more nuanced environment of human interaction,
the most successful forgiving strategy might be generous but
discerning. If the cues indicate that an apology is sincere and the
transgressor is committed to future cooperation, then the victim who
is able to forgive generously might well reap more benefits from future
interaction than one who forgives less generously. An emotional
commitment to forgive in the face of a heartfelt apology might thus be
beneficial. On the other hand, effective scrutiny of the apology might
well require any number of rational calculations, including a
calculation of the value of the relationship to each party. Moreover,
strong contradictory emotions can be at play for victims contemplating
postconflict resolution. The victim's anger can dissipate in the face of a
heartfelt apology, seemingly out of her own control. But at times the
results are not so cathartic; some victims dismiss apologies and hold
onto grudges out of an emotional commitment to spite or revenge.
Thus, emotional commitments toward generous forgiveness are less
clearly valuable; nevertheless, many people respond emotionally to
apologies that appear sincere, and where those emotions are at work,
the individuals feel favorably disposed to reconcile conflict.
53. FRANK, supra note 51, at 125-31.
54. Id. at 53-54.
55. Supra Part II.A.
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C. Ingroup vs. Outgroup Differences
Although apology can play a powerful role in reconciling
conflict, apologetic behaviors and their results are hardly uniform.
Tendencies to apologize and to forgive likely are dependent on a
number of factors, including personality,56 culture,57 and sex.58 In
addition, and more relevant to the present topic, reconciliation
behaviors are also highly dependent on the nature of the relationship
between the transgressor and the victim. Consider hierarchy, for
example. De Waal indicates that in highly hierarchical primate
groups, dominants initiate reconciliation efforts far less often than in
more egalitarian primate species. 59 Subordinates might well have
more need to restore a relationship. One might therefore expect that
in human societies and organizations, subordinates will apologize to
superiors more frequently than superiors will apologize to
subordinates. 60 On the other hand, apology rituals appear to be more
common in hierarchical settings than in egalitarian settings.61 It may
56. See Deborah levi, Why Not Just Apologize? How To Say You're Sorry, in ADR, 18
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 147, 165 (2000) (noting that involved
individuals' personalities might be inconsistent with effective apology); see also Brent T. White,
Say You're Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261,
1289 (2006) (noting that the effects of forced apology might depend on the personality of the
transgressor).
57. Hickson, supra note 25, at 283. Some, for example, note a greater inclination on the part
of the Japanese to apologize compared to the people of Western nations. Wagatsuma & Rosett,
supra note 25, at 461; see also Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean
Dispute Settlement (with Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2
(2005). Others have drawn a distinction between "shame" and "guilt" cultures. Michael C.
Luebbert, The Survival Value of Forgiveness, in EVOLUTION OF THE PSYCHE, supra note 25, at
169, 178-89. But see TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 37-44 (questioning validity of guilt/shame
distinction for understanding apologies). Still others have noted probable differences in
collectivist and individualist countries in their propensity to apologize for the transgressions of
others. Triandis, supra note 25, at 35, 39.
58. Some studies find sex differences in willingness to apologize for small transgressions.
See, e.g., Janet Holmes, Sex Differences and Apologies: One Aspect of Communicative
Competence, 10 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 194, 197 (1989) (analyzing a New Zealand study showing
differences between the apology rates of male and female students). Others have not found sex
differences in willingness to apologize. Bruce Fraser, On Apologizing, in CONVERSATIONAL
ROUTINE: EXPLORATIONS IN STANDARDIZED COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS AND PREPATTERNED
SPEECH 259, 269 (Flourian Coulmas ed., 1981). Regarding small transgressions, one study found
that men are more likely to apologize for intrusions on time while women are more likely to
apologize for intrusions on space. Judith Mattson Bean & Barbara Johnstone, Workplace
Reasons for Saying You're Sorry: Discourse Task Management and Apology, 17 DISCOURSE
PROCESSES 59, 79 (Roy 0. Freedle ed., 1994).
59. DE WAAL, supra note 24, at 44, 163-65, 220 (discussing practices among stumptail
monkeys, chimpanzees, and bonobos).
60. O'Hara, supra note 16, at 1076.
61. Hickson, supra note 25, at 285-87.
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be that apologies help to reinforce the hierarchy: subordinate apology
could serve to restore the dominant's favor,62 whereas dominants may
proffer apology in lieu of tangible compensation.63 These speculations
need further exploration in the literature. Note, however, that the
dynamics of hierarchy occur within the context of a given social group.
As implied by the discussion of subordinate apology, the
importance of the relationship to each of the parties also appears to
influence reconciliation behaviors.64 We can all think of situations
where we have felt a sense of relief when a loved one apologizes for
poor behavior. The subjective costs of continuing these conflicts and
losing the benefits of a close relationship are no doubt larger than in
cases where conflict arises with casual acquaintances or strangers.
Taken to its extreme, this inclination to reconcile can prove harmful to
the victim. For example, there is some indication that victims of
domestic violence often are overinclined to forgive their batterers
because they frequently see themselves as having no viable options
outside the relationship. 65 In these situations, the victim may be so
desperate to continue the relationship that she ignores indications
that the batterer's promise to forbear future transgressions is not
credible. At the other end of the spectrum, we may be much more
cynical about apologies offered as public gestures by individuals whom
we do not personally know and whom we do not need for security,
prosperity, or happiness.
Victim willingness to reconcile with a transgressor likely also
depends on the extent to which the victim perceives the transgressor
to be a member of the victim's ingroup. De Waal's primate
reconciliation studies, for example, all involve conflicts within a
primate group that lives together. All of his examples of reconciliation
involve continuing relationships of mutual support, and studies of
primates outside of a single captive colony are very rare. The ingroup
hypothesis, however, has some support in the available literature. In a
study of primate reconciliation within a single colony of long-tail
62. Cf. Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted. Incorporating a Feminist Analysis Into Evidence
Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221, 252 (1999) ('Dominance
feminism would recognize that apologies may be a style of coping for subordinate groups-
weaker groups who are acculturated to apologize, to curry favor, to ensure safety, and to
reinforce the hierarchy.").
63. O'Hara, supra note 16, at 1077.
64. See, e.g., Joan B. Silk, The Form and Function of Reconciliation in Primates, 31 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 21, 37 (2002) (noting that in disputing adult humans, "relationships that
have important economic, social or political utility are more likely to be resolved").
65. Cf. O'Hara, supra note 16, at 1073-74 & n.74 (noting that more than forty percent of
women utilizing domestic violence shelters return to their batterers and citing studies indicating
that victims are more likely to return when they do not perceive decent alternatives).
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macaques, researchers found that reconciliation tendencies were
higher between macaques that needed one another's cooperation to
obtain a desirable food than they were between other macaques within
the colony.6
6
Recently, a study of rhesus monkeys living on an uninhabited
island southeast of Puerto Rico showed possible evidence that the
monkeys had developed biases in favor of ingroup and against
outgroup members. 67 Rhesus monkeys live in tight-knit social groups.
Subjects were presented with pictures of other rhesus monkeys who
were from either within or outside of the subject's group. The subject
monkeys stared at pictures of outgroup members for a longer period of
time than they stared at pictures of group members. This difference
persisted even when the monkey was familiar with the outgroup
monkey represented in the picture. In addition, when the researchers
paired the group member's picture with pictures of either good (fruit)
or bad (spiders) objects, subjects stared longer at the group
member/bad object pairing. Conversely, when the subject was
presented with an outgroup rhesus monkey picture paired with
pictures of either good or bad objects, it stared longer at the outgroup
member/good object pairings. Researchers believe that the subject's
length of attention indicates its views on whether the pairing is
natural or consistent; according to this theory, incongruent pairings
result in greater attention paid by the subject. These results mirror
studies of humans that attempt to ascertain implicit attitudes; there,
too, researchers believe that longer response times indicate a
subconscious determination that the pairings are incongruent.
Human societies are much more fluid and dynamic than those
of other primates. We affiliate with large numbers of groups over the
course of our lifetimes for different purposes, and we identify with
others along a large number of dimensions, including nationality,
ethnicity, religious affiliation, neighborhood of residence, place of
employment, shared professional training, hobbies, and personality
traits. As a matter of practical reality, then, the notion of ingroup and
outgroup is neither as dichotomous nor as fixed a concept for humans
as it may be for other primates. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that
a person's sense of another as a member of an ingroup or outgroup can
be stronger or weaker depending on a number of factors that
contribute to this sense of strength. Perhaps the strength of
66. Marina Cords & Sylvie Thurnheer, Reconciling with Valuable Partners by Long-tailed
Macaques, 93 ETHOLOGY 315, 315 (1993).
67. Neha Mahajan et al., The Evolution of Intergroup Bias: Perceptions and Attitudes in
Rhesus Macaques, 100 J. PERSONAULTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 387, 387 (2011).
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ingroup/outgroup attitudes could serve as a rough proxy for the
subjective value of a relationship. If so, then all else being equal, the
more clearly the transgressor appears to be a member of the outgroup
in the eyes of the victim, the less likely it is that the victim will be
willing to reconcile when confronted with the same conciliatory
gestures. Conversely, the stronger the victim's perception that the
transgressor is a member of the ingroup, the more likely it is that the
victim would be willing to reconcile.
Even if group attitudes are more variable for humans, the
phenomenon of categorizing others as members of an ingroup or
outgroup is apparently every bit as automatic and as dichotomous for
humans as it is for other primates. Very subtle experimental
measures can trigger the categorization of others as part of an ingroup
or an outgroup. For example, the simple use of inclusive pronouns,
such as we, us, and our, versus exclusive pronouns, such as they,
them, and their, causes subjects to place others in the categories
suggested by the pronouns used.68 Indeed, when the word "we" was
paired with nonsense syllables (e.g., "xeh"), subjects rated the
nonsense syllables significantly more positively than subjects who
viewed the nonsense syllable paired with an unrelated control word.
69
The fact that biases associated with ingroups appeared in this study,
where no social connections are present, illustrates both their strength
and their innateness. Furthermore, in the context of implicit attitude
testing, subjects who were presented with ingroup pronouns
responded more quickly to positive traits, which were later presented
on a computer screen, than subjects who were not presented with the
ingroup pronouns.
7°
In another experiment, subjects were told that they would be
working with two other individuals to complete a task; they were then
asked to read a script into the microphone to help give directions to
the others about the task. Some subjects were given a script that used
the words "we" and "our" (e.g., "we have been asked to ... .... our task
is to . . ."), while others were given scripts that did not use these
ingroup pronouns. After reading the script, the subjects were asked to
rate both their expectations about the other two individuals and their
expectations about whether the subject expected the group to work as
one team or as separate individuals. Subjects who were presented
with the ingroup pronouns rated the other group members more
68. SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMON
INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 104 (2000).
69. Id. at 106.
70. Id. at 107-08.
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highly and were more likely to express a belief that the group would
work together as a single team.7 1 In all of these experiments, subjects
indicated a significant bias toward members of their perceived
ingroup, and researchers could easily prime these perceptions.
Negative biases and hostile attitudes toward members of
outgroups also are well documented. Many species of animals will
behave violently to the introduction of a new member of the species.
After describing multiple studies, for example, one scholar observed
that "[p]rimate social units appear, in general, to be intolerant of close
proximity to extra-group [members of the same species]." 72 Even
within a social unit, it is common for group members to target, attack,
or at least ostracize other members of the unit who appear to be
deviant due to illness, incapacity, or other external differences. 73 Some
scholars suggest that this casting of the deviant into the outgroup
category occurs because the ingroup perceives the deviant as a threat
to group norms, beliefs, and behaviors.
7 4
Researchers observed this phenomenon in a number of species,
including humans. 75 For humans, outgroup biases often take the form
of a generalized distrust of strangers. More generally, studies indicate
that humans ascribe more positive attributes to ingroup members and
more negative attributes to outgroup members. Basically, we are more
inclined to interpret the behavior and motives of ingroup members
favorably than we are to grant the same benefit of the doubt to
outgroup members. We are also more likely to anticipate cooperation
from ingroup members than from outgroup members. 76 And, when in a
competitive environment, the negative stereotyping of outgroup
members becomes much more prevalent. 77
These negative biases are "open to considerable cultural
manipulation"78 though, allowing negative reactions toward outgroup
members to be mitigated in a number of ways. In general,
mechanisms that cause individuals to focus on similarities and
71. Id. at 111-12.
72. Johan M.G. van der Dennen, Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group Differentiation. A
Review and Interpretation of the Literature, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM:
EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF XENOPHOBIA, DIScRIMINATION, RACISM AND NATIONALISM 1, 21
(Vernon Reynolds et al. eds., 1987).
73. Id. at 23-24.
74. Id. at 28.
75. See id. at 21-28.
76. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 139 (1991).
77. Jay W. Jackson, Realistic Group Conflict Theory: A Review and Evaluation of the
Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 43 PSYCHOL. REC. 395 (1993).
78. Robin I.M. Dunbar, Sociobiological Explanations and the Evolution of Ethnocentrism, in
THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM, supra note 72, at 56.
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compatibilities rather than on differences can influence
ingroup/outgroup perceptions. In addition, outgroup perceptions can
be mitigated by placing the two groups into a superordinate group in
which members of the subgroup carry a positive affiliation (i.e.,
despite our differences, we are all Americans, Christians, etc.).7 9 And
outgroup biases can be mitigated by placing individuals in a
cooperative rather than a competitive environment.80 These strategies
likely help to increase the perception that the outgroup member(s)
share similar norms, beliefs, and behaviors with ingroup members.
The dispute resolution literature has begun to incorporate
some very basic insights from the ingroup/outgroup literature. For
example, Jennifer Gerarda Brown notes that people with different
backgrounds and cultures will communicate with different styles and
emphases and that these differences can work to create unfair biases
in VOM participation.81 International relations and conflict resolution
scholars have noted the special challenges that outgroup biases create
for attempting to reconcile ethnic and other intergroup conflicts. 82 To
date, however, the effects of ingroup/outgroup association on the
efficacy of reconciliation have not received sustained discussion. As
will become more apparent in Part III, one of the lessons from the PR
following the BP oil spill is that the topic deserves more serious
attention.
In the meantime, here are some hypotheses about how
ingroup/outgroup biases influence reconciliation efforts through
apology. The presence of ingroup/outgroup biases suggests that
reconciliation efforts will be more difficult when the victim perceives
the transgressor to be a member of an outgroup. By definition,
outgroup members provide smaller relational benefits than ingroup
members, so there is less benefit to reconciling with them, all else
equal. Moreover, the ingroup/outgroup literature suggests that a
victim is less likely to ascribe a positive motivation to an apology from
an outgroup transgressor, and she is less likely to forecast that the
transgressor will engage in cooperative behaviors in the future. In
some cases, the very fact of the transgression is likely to cause a
victim to place the transgressor into the outgroup category reserved
79. See GAERTNER & DOVIDIO, supra note 68, at 83, 124.
80. See id. at 120.
81. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1286 (1994).
82. See, e.g., Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, A Biological Approach to
Understanding Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Group Conflict, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2009). See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGINGS:
JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993).
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for deviants. If the transgressor belongs to a different class or national
or racial group, then these additional "otherness" features can further
hinder productive reconciliation.
D. Organizational Apology
Although organizations are nonhuman, their activities can
harm and offend others. Through their agents and employees,
corporations and other organizations can cause accidents, design and
distribute harmful products and services, engage in scandalous or
illegal behavior, and violate norms of social responsibility.8 3 When
third parties are harmed by these activities, apologies can help victims
heal while reducing the potential liabilities of the organization.
Apologies can also help redeem the organization's reputation.
There is ample evidence that organizations can use apologies to
produce some of the same benefits that individual transgressors
produce when they apologize. Consider, for example, the disclosure
and apology policies recently adopted by some U.S. hospitals. During
the 1990s, the Veterans' Affairs ("VA") hospital in Lexington,
Kentucky, embarked upon a novel experiment. s4 It adopted a policy to
disclose any known medical error to the patient harmed by that error,
to offer corrective medical treatment or compensation to the patient,
and to deliver an apology to the patient.8 5 During the first seven-year
period after implementation of this new policy, the hospital
experienced a larger number of patient claims but significantly
reduced liability costs.8 6 Some people were reasonably skeptical of the
generalizability of these results because VA hospitals are unlikely to
face the same potential liabilities as other hospitals. For example, VA
hospitals are different from private hospitals in several ways: they are
not subject to punitive damages, their public-sector nature reduces
their exposure to liability, and their patients, as veterans, have
additional sources of compensation.87 Because of these factors, VA
hospital patients have less to lose by settling with an apology and
modest compensation than civilian patients who suffer from medical
83. See KEITH MICHAEL HEARIT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY APOLOGY: CORPORATE RESPONSES
TO ALLEGATIONS OFWRONGDOING 122-23 (2006).
84. See Cohen, supra note 42, at 1451.
85. Id. at 1451 n.9.
86. E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Errors. Pinning the Blame Versus Blaming the System, in
ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 213, 217 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004);
see also Cohen, supra note 42, at 1457.
87. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don't Know About the Role of Apologies in
Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1023 (2005).
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errors in other hospitals. More recently, however, the results have
been replicated in non-VA hospitals. For example, a similar policy
implemented by the University of Michigan Health System produced a
cut in medical malpractice suits by more than fifty percent.88 Other
hospitals have recently implemented similar policies.8 9 The results
suggest that patients respond favorably to apologies offered on behalf
of institutions.
There is also some evidence that apology works to resurrect an
organization in the eyes of third-party observers. Reputation
influences the welfare of an organization as much as it influences
individuals. 90 An organization's ability to recruit active members,
employees, customers, and other business opportunities will be
furthered by a positive reputation and hampered by a negative one.91
Studies also indicate that organizations can bolster their reputations
with effective apologies. For example, in a study involving 264
university students, subjects were given a vignette describing a
property management company that both refused to return renter
deposits to college-student tenants and refused to provide receipts for
claimed repairs. Some subjects were told that the owner of the
company had accepted full responsibility for its acts. Some were told
that the owner regretted the company's actions. Some were told both.
And some were given no information regarding the owner's
responsibility or regret. Both the company's regret and recognition of
responsibility positively affected subjects' reputation scores for the
company. Additionally, the presence of these factors reduced the
reported anger that subjects felt toward the company. On the other
hand, apology statements that didn't contain these elements failed to
resurrect the company in subjects' ratings.92
88. Boothman et al., supra note 42, at 147.
89. See Carol Bayley, Medical Mistakes and Institutional Culture, in ACCOUNTABII[TY,
supra note 86, at 99, 102-05 (discussing similar disclosure policy adopted by Catholic Healthcare
West system).
90. William M. Sage stated:
[R]eputation not only accrues to better-performing companies, but also enables their
performance. A good reputation attracts corporate partners, sponsors and employees in
addition to customers, and reassures government regulators. In repeated transactions,
reputation serves to enforce contracts without recourse to law. The premium paid by
acquirers for goodwill also provides incentive for each successive owner to invest money
and effort to preserve a firm's established reputation.
William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in ACCOUNTABILITY,
supra note 86, at 159, 180 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id.
92. Kristin M. Pace et al., The Acceptance of Responsibility and Expressions of Regret in
Organizational Apologies After a Transgression, 15 CORP. COMM. INTL J. 410, 420-22 (2010).
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Given that basic rules of apology apply to organizations when
they commit wrongdoing, companies should focus on the delivery of
effective apology when appropriate. But organizations, especially
corporations and other for-profit entities, may be disadvantaged
relative to individuals in their ability to reconcile through apology.
Although the above studies indicate that victims and third parties
respond in similar ways to apologies proffered by organizations, we do
not know whether organizational apologies are as effective as
individual apologies. And there is some reason to surmise that, all else
being equal, the organizational apology will be less effective than an
apology from an individual transgressor. First, apologies work for
individuals in part because the strong emotional attachment that we
have to our personal relationships causes us to value reconciliation; by
contrast, the organization does not itself have emotions and is
therefore not part of the very close personal relationships that we
enjoy. Thus, we can expect the victim and others to have relatively
less emotional dependence on the organization, and this lower
dependence could make individuals less receptive to an organization's
apology.9 3 Second, for-profit organizations exist to generate profits,
which enhances the likelihood that people scrutinizing their behaviors
will attribute those behaviors to rational calculations. Also, because
the main purpose of those organizations is to generate profits, victims
and third parties are likely more inclined to think that they should
remedy their wrongs through the payment of money. Thus, the
reduced liabilities from apologies, although present, may be smaller
for for-profit organizations.
However, organizations have one powerful advantage over
individuals in the delivery of apology. Because organizations consist of
multiple individuals, individuals within the organization who
contribute to a transgression need not be the same individuals who
specialize in the delivery of apologies. When a doctor screws up in the
operating room, he has only his own personality, haughty or genuine,
with which to attempt to convey a transgressor's apology. Of course,
the doctor can hire a PR person, but then he looks like he is hiding
behind another, and the apology is less likely to be effective.94 In
contrast, people view an organization as a single entity even though
multiple individuals conduct its activities. When the hospital makes
an error, it doesn't matter if it is run by one hundred Hawks who
93. Given the lack of emotional dependence on them, it might be easier for people to cast
organizations into the outgroup category.
94. Cf. TAVUCHIS, supra note 27, at 23 ("There is, quite simply, nothing as effective and
unsettling as having to address in person someone we have wronged.').
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control the organization's policies; so long as it keeps a few (perhaps
even one) sweetheart Dove(s) around to manage the PR, it can reap all
the available benefits of apology.95 When the spokesperson of an
organization speaks on behalf of the organization, she is the
organization for purposes of public perception. All of the attitudes and
attributes that the spokesperson elicits can affect others' perceptions
of the organization itself. If the hypotheses presented above about
ingroup and outgroup effects on apology are correct, then a large
organization can house several Doves, each of whom can elicit ingroup
attitudes in some targeted portion of the population. Put differently, it
is possible for organizations to exploit our human propensity to forgive
following a heartfelt apology. On the other hand, if the company
spokesperson commits a PR blunder or evokes outgroup hostilities,
then the whole organization can feel the negative effects.
III. CORPORATE APOLOGY: LESSONS FROM THE BP OIL SPILL
When businesses are accused of causing harms or committing
wrongs, sometimes the best possible PR strategy is for corporate
leaders to admit fault, apologize for any harm caused, and offer to do
what they can to fix or at least ameliorate the damage. But corporate
leaders are not always so wise. Sometimes they lack clear evidence of
fault or wish to avoid having to accept blame. At other times, they
accept blame but their expressions of remorse fall flat. It seems that
corporate apology has evolved through a series of blunders made by
corporate leaders providing lessons for future leaders to absorb. This
part describes both the lessons that BP learned from Exxon's handling
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the lessons that future corporate
leaders can learn from BP's mishandling of PR after the Macondo oil
spill.
A. Exxon After the Exxon Valdez Accident
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground in Prince
William Sound in Alaska and spilled more than eleven million gallons
of crude oil into the sea.96 Damage from the spill represented the worst
95. For some wrongs, a high-level management person, such as the CEO, Chairman of the
Board, Regional President, or the like, will need to handle the initial PR. That person will do
better with Dove-like tendencies, but the point is the organization may be able to call on a
number of managers and then turn over the PR task to an even more skilled individual with
lesser authority within the organization.
96. For the Environmental Protection Agency's description of the event and remediation
efforts by the U.S. government, see Exxon Valdez, EPA.Gov, httpJ/www.epa.gov/oem/content/
learning/exxon.htm (last visited June 15, 2011).
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environmental disaster in U.S. history to that point, 97 including the
pollution of more than a thousand miles of shoreline, the death of tens
of thousands of animals, and the temporary destruction of the
livelihoods of thousands of fishermen.98 According to some accounts,
the captain of the ship was a heavy drinker who consumed alcohol
before boarding the ship and went to sleep after turning over the
ship's navigation to an uncertified third party.99 For six days after the
spill, the company remained silent until the media-shy CEO Lawrence
Rawl finally emerged to comment-but not to apologize-on behalf of
the company.100 Ten days after the accident, Exxon finally ran full-
page ads in 166 newspapers apologizing for the spill. 101 Rawl waited
nearly three weeks to visit the area of the spill. 0 2 In defending his
own inaction sometime later, Rawl stated that he was busy running
the company from New York. 103 When it was suggested that Exxon-
rather than taxpayers-pay for all of the cleanup costs, one Exxon
executive said that if the company was forced to do so then it would
raise gas prices to cover the costs. 0 4 Despite its printed apology and
the fact that Exxon ultimately took significant responsibility for
cleanup costs, the company's reputation suffered for many years. 05
Many consumers refused to purchase from Exxon'06 and a jury
imposed a $5 billion punitive damages fine on the company for
"reckless" behavior (the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently reduced
this award to approximately $500 million). 107
There was no doubt that Exxon would suffer some of these
financial losses in any event simply because one of its ships caused
97. See id.
98. Jennifer Bayot, Lawrence Rawl, 76, Exxon's Chief in Valdez Spill, Dies, N.Y TIMES, Feb.
16, 2005, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/obituaries/16rawl.html.
99. See The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster, EXPLORE NORTH, http'/explorenorth.con
library/weekly/aa032499.htm (last visited June 15, 2011) (reporting that a jury subsequently
acquitted the captain of charges that he had operated the tanker while intoxicated).
100. See Jennifer Hogue, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, AVOIDING DISASTER: THE IMPORTANCE
OF HAVING A CRISIS PLAN, httpJ/iml.jou.ufl.eduLprojects/springOl/hogue/exxorLhtml (last visited
Sept. 22, 2011).
101. Stuart Elliott, Exxon's Image Soiled; Public Angry at Slow Action on Oil Spill, USA
TODAY, Apr. 21, 1989, at lB.
102. Id.
103. See Richard Behar, Interview with Lawrence Rawl: Exxon Strikes Back, TIME, Mar. 26,
1990, at 62-63, available at http:lwww.time.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171,969673,00.html.
104. Id.
105. Cf. Anne C. Mulkern, BP's PR Blunders Mirror Exxon's, Appear Destined for Record
Book, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/10/lOgreenwire-bps-pr-
blunders-mirror-exxons-appear-destined-98819.html (stating that although Exxon survived and
is profitable, "its reputation and its image will be forever linked to the Valdez oil spill').
106. Hogue, supra note 100.
107. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481, 515 (2008).
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injury to the environment and to the Alaskan fishing and tourist
industries. But a botched PR response surely cost it much more than
necessary in company profits. These losses could have been avoided
with a more careful handling of the situation. The public doubted the
sincerity of the company's apology, which in turn caused doubts about
the extent to which Exxon would forgo short-term profits in order to
promote safety and environmentally sound practices.
Exxon's face-saving gestures appeared insincere in several
ways. First, the delay in providing an initial public statement
suggested that the company was avoiding acceptance of responsibility,
failing to take the severity of the harm caused by the accident
seriously, or both. Second, the company delivered its first apology
more than ten days after the accident and used the passive medium of
a print advertisement. Written apologies are often less effective than
oral apologies because they are more difficult to scrutinize for
sincerity. Additionally, written apologies can create the impression
that the transgressor is avoiding full ownership of the wrong. And
advertisements, as venues for earning profits, are probably
particularly suspect vehicles through which to express responsibility
and remorse. Third, the statement that the company will raise gas
prices to pay for the cleanup costs, even if an accurate depiction of
economic realities, suggests that the company will continue to wield
its power over its victims even when remediating its wrongs.
Rawl never really appreciated the company's errors. A year
after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, he participated in an interview with
Time magazine in which he both emphasized how harrowing the
aftermath of the spill had been for him and expressed bitterness at the
refusal of the American public to accept the company's apologies.
108
Rawl believed that environmental groups used the company as a
scapegoat to further their broader regulatory agendas. 0 9 Moreover, he
minimized the fact that thousands of consumers had cut up their
Exxon credit cards by arguing that those customers did not purchase
much from the company anyway." 10
B. BPAfter the Macondo Well Rupture
BP's public statements after the Macondo oil spill suggest that
company executives learned from Exxon's behavior. BP's CEO, Tony
Hayward, responded immediately and spoke regularly with the
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media,111 personally flew over the affected area to view the oil
leakage, 112 visited the oil-stained beaches once the oil washed
ashore, 113 and stated many times publicly that the company would pay
the full costs of the cleanup. 114 The company offered a $20 billion fund
to help pay for the damage caused to local industries.1 15 Moreover,
both Hayward1 16 and President Obama'1 7 made public statements that
the company was financially strong and could absorb these costs.
Their statements suggested both that the company's promise to pay
was credible and that BP might successfully avoid raising prices or
cutting safety corners in the future to recover from these liabilities.
Hayward delivered his apologies in person, allowing his features to
indicate a sense of deep remorse: his eyes turned glassy and red, his
soft facial expressions signaled regret, and his skin tone grew flush.118
A viewer scrutinizing Hayward's apology might well conclude that his
(and therefore BP's) sense of regret was both sincere and significant
and that the company was genuinely trying hard to cap the well.
The apology alone was not sufficient to remove all sense of
resentment toward BP. Initial estimates that a thousand barrels of
111. See Clifford Krauss, For BP, a Battle to Contain Leaks and an Image Fight, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2OlOO51/07/science/07container.html (noting that
Hayward was "getting in front of the camera as much as possible in an effort to put the best light
on his giant oil company").
112. Id.
113. Kevin McGill, BP CEO Inspects Oil-Stained Beaches, HOUMATODAY.COM (May 24, 2010),
http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20100524/ARTICLES/100529667.
114. See Erwin Seba, Ros Krasny & Jeffrey Jones, Factbox: Chronology of Gulf of Mexico Oil
Spill, REUTERS, May 13, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/05/13/us-oil-rig-leak-factbox-
idUKTRE64A6PT20100513 ("BP Chairman Tony Hayward says the company takes full
responsibility and will pay all legitimate claims and the cost of the cleanup.").
115. See Mimi Hall, Apologetic BP Pledges $20B; Obama: No Cap on Spill Compensation,
USA TODAY, June 17, 2010, at 1A, available at http:llwww.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-
06-16-obama-bp-oilN.htm.
116. See Matthew Scott, BP Delays a Decision About Canceling Its Dividend, DAILY FIN.
(June 4, 2010, 12:05 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2OlO/06/04bp-delays-a-decision-about-
canceling-its-dividend! (reporting Hayward's statements that BP was performing well and that
its asset base and balance sheet remain among the "very best").
117. See Alister Bull, White House: BP Big Enough to Survive Oil Spill Damage, REUTERS,
June 1, 2010, available at httpJ/www.reuters.com/article2010/06/01/oil-spill.whitehouse-bp-
idUSWEN53482
0100601 (reporting statements by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs that BP could
absorb the expense associated with the spill).
118. Consider, for example, the apology that Hayward delivered as part of his Congressional
testimony on June 17, 2010. In addition to the features mentioned in the text, Hayward had dark
circles under his eyes, indicating that perhaps he was losing sleep trying to fix the problem. See
generally Associated Press, BP's Hayward at Hearing: 'Deeply Sorry, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8p4s7EE6FY.
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crude oil gushed into the ocean per day 19 were woefully inaccurate,
and by August the Environmental Protection Agency estimated that
sixty times more oil than that was actually gushing from the well.
120
The damage to the ocean and coastal environments seemed likely to be
massive, 121 especially because the company seemed incapable of
finding a way to cap the spill. But given this dismal situation,
Hayward's apology and repeated pledge to pay for the cleanup and
damage was able to at least convey BP's incompetence rather than
indifference or malevolence. Some called for a government takeover of
the cleanup.122 Some questioned whether BP's drilling operations
should be subject to more stringent regulatory oversight. 123 But the
company's initial PR efforts probably worked to insulate the company
from the worst consequences of reputation-harming conduct, such as
future customer boycotts and potential punitive damages liability. 1
24
BP did not fully internalize the lessons from Exxon's botched
Exxon Valdez response, however. Efforts to stop the oil from gushing
continued to fail, and, despite some evidence that the leaking oil was
at least partly the fault of Transocean, which owned and operated the
drilling rig, 125 public blame remained focused on BP. Moreover, the
119. See Peter J. Brennan & Jordan Burke, BP's Gulf Oil Well Leak May Take Months to
Shut After Drilling Rig Sinks, BLOOMBERG.COM Apr. 25, 2010, httpl/www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-04-24!bp-says- 1-000-barrels-of-oil-leaking- daily-from- sunken- gulf-of- mexico-rig.html.
120. Ben Geman, Oil Spill Panek Botched Oil Flow Estimates Hindered Multiple Phases of
BP's Response, THE HILL (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:17 PM), httpJ/thehill.comfblogs/e2-wire/677-e2-
wire/130373-oil-spill- panel-botched-oil- flow-estimate s-hindere d- multiple-phase s-of-bps-re sponse.
121. See Gaelin Rosenwaks, Oil Spill's Environmental Costs, TORONTO SUN, June 5, 2010,
http://www.torontosun.cominews/world/2010/06/05114277081.html (outlining the various
environmental effects of the spill, including those caused by the cleanup rather than by the spill
itself).
122. Environmentalists Want Fed Control of Oil Cleanup, SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 2010,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmynationworld/2011902316-apusgulfoilspillmonitoring.html
?syndication=rss.
123. See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP's Gulf of Mexico Drilling from Environmental
Impact Study, WASH. POST, May 5, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontent
/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.html (reporting on the concerns of lawmakers that BP's
operations had previously been rubber-stamped); see also Julie Schmit, Deep-Water Drilling Hits
Still Waters, USA TODAY, May 28, 2010, at 3B, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/MONEY/usaedition2010-05-28-offshoredril128_STU.htm (stating that the Obama
administration took steps to pause the offshore drilling industry's "march to drill in even deeper
waters').
124. See Associated Press, Punitive Damages Ruled Possible in Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/business/punitive-damages-ruled-possible-in-
gulf-oil-spill.htmlr=l&ref=gulfofmexico20l0 (reporting that federal district court has
concluded that plaintiffs may seek punitive damages on some of their claims against BP).
125. See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), NYTIMES.coM, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil.spills/gulfof.mexico_2010/index.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2011) (reporting that presidential panel concluded that Transocean was among the firms that
"took a series of hazardous and time-saving steps without adequate consideration of the risks
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continued gushing of oil coupled with the repeated rise in spill
estimates created a situation where the sense of transgression was
continually renewed. As a result, the company could not simply
deliver a few heartfelt apologies and then get to work cleaning up the
mess. Instead, the situation demanded that BP's apology discourse
continue over time. And it required BP to view the situation as a
growing crisis that demanded the full attention of company leaders.
Over time, however, Hayward appeared to grow weary of
handling the crisis. On May 30, 2010, nearly seven weeks after the
explosion, Hayward delivered a statement of apology to a reporter that
exuded his fatigue and frustration. In the process, he committed
Rawl's blunder of suggesting that other matters might be more
important than managing the crisis. Hayward stated: "We're sorry.
We're sorry for the massive disruption it's caused to their lives. And
there's no one who wants this thing over more than I do. I'd like my
life back." 26 Hayward apparently made these statements in an effort
to prove that he would not let the company dither in its efforts to cap
the spewing oil and clean up the beaches. He might well have thought
that these statements would bolster a belief that the crisis was his
number one priority. Unfortunately, the public perceived his words
very differently. Part of the problem was that when Hayward said
that he wanted his life back, the tone in his voice oozed frustration
and irritation. His nonverbalized cues suggested that his personal
priorities placed other activities over fixing the problem in the Gulf. In
that moment, Hayward appeared to be disassociating himself from
BP. He was an employee beleaguered by the actions that had caused
harm and was tired of having to put so much effort into helping fix a
problem for which he did not consider himself personally responsible.
In the eyes of the public, however, Hayward was not separate from
BP; rather, he was BP. And the public heard his statements of
personal weariness as company statements about poor priorities in the
aftermath of disastrous harm.
The discussion of apology in Part II suggested that effective
apologies only work when the transgressor places himself in a morally
inferior position relative to the victim, expresses a willingness to do
whatever it takes to resurrect himself, and bestows upon the victim
the power to determine whether forgiveness will be forthcoming. It is
involved"); Transocean Seeks to Limit Liability for Oil Rig Blast, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May, 13,
2010), http://www.npr.orgs.php?sId=126798122&m=l (stating that despite two failed tests on
the well, workers decided to continue work).
126. See BP CEO Tony Hayward: I'd Like My Life Back,' YOUTUBE (May 31, 2010),
http://www.youtube.comwatch?v=MTdKa9eWNFw&feature-related (clip of statement made on
The Today Show (NBC television broadcast May 30, 2010) by BP CEO Tony Hayward).
2011] 1985
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
typically counterproductive for a transgressor to say, "I am sorry but
I'm tired of trying to convince you of that." Although unintended, this
is precisely the message that Hayward conveyed.
The public interpretation of Hayward's comments were made
worse by the fact that Hayward, as representative of BP, displayed a
public persona that caused the viewing public to place BP further
along the outgroup portion of the ingroup/outgroup spectrum.
Hayward's statements and conduct evoked images of a transgressor
from a different social class and national/ethnic group than both the
American public and the direct victims of the spill. Regarding class,
Hayward's arrival on the beach in expensive business attire while
expressing frustration over the time commitment associated with
managing the spill suggested that he was an elite who had much
better things to do than work for the welfare of the victims of his
spill. 127 Hayward confirmed that sense anew when, three weeks later,
the public media published photographs showing him with his son at a
yacht race on the Isle of Wight.
Hayward's thick British accent probably exacerbated the
negative connotations of his resentful statements because it pegged
him and the company as foreign-non-Americans who might not care
much about the U.S. coastline. In his late-night television show, David
Letterman joked about Hayward's statement that he wanted his life
back. Letterman commented, "[W]ell, that was a smug, ugly, arrogant
thing to say. And... that British accent makes it sound worse." 128 The
joke resonated with the audience. 129 With their laughter, the audience
showed that they found Hayward's comment to be arrogant. When he
attempted to place himself into a superior rather than an inferior
position while apologizing in his British accent, it is possible that
Hayward reminded Americans of their former colonization and
awakened the long-held belief that the British view themselves as
socially superior.
As mentioned earlier, ingroups and outgroups can form along
many dimensions and researchers can easily manipulate our tendency
127. See Elizabeth Shogren, BP: A Textbook Example of How Not to Handle PR, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, Apr. 21, 2011, httpJ/www.npr.org/2011/04121/135575238bp-a-textbook-example-of-how-
not-to-handle-pr (stating that one PR blunder was that outside consultants and rookies "let him
walk the beach in a starched white shirt"); see also Anne C. Mulkern, BPs PR Blunders Mirror
Exxon's, Appear Destined for Record Book, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com
/gwire/2010/06/10/10greenwire -bps-pr- blunders -mirror-exxons-appear -destined-
98819.html?pagewanted=all (highlighting various PR blunders made by Hayward).
128. Late Show with David Letterman (CBS television broadcast June 16, 2010) (transcript
available at LIVE DASH, http://www.livedash.com/transcript/late-show-with-david-letterman]




to dichotomize social situations in this way in experimental settings.
That said, categorizations based on race, ethnicity, and nationality
seem to form even more readily than others, which is part of why
ethnic and international conflicts can be so difficult to resolve
effectively. 130 To some extent, it can be rational for citizens of one
nation to worry about the handling of a major crisis by a person or
team of people from another nation. Cultural differences can
significantly influence organizational management, which in turn can
influence the management of problems. For example, workers in
different nations vary dramatically in their tendency to avoid
uncertainty, the degree to which working styles can be characterized
as "masculine" or "feminine," the extent to which viewpoints tend to be
individualist or collective, the relative acceptance of power and status
differences, and short-term versus long-term decisional
perspectives.' 3 Interestingly, however, studies of these differing
dimensions place the United States and the United Kingdom fairly
close to one another along each of these dimensions. 132 Therefore, any
outgroup bias resulting from Hayward's British accent was likely
relatively minimal and might have been overcome under other
circumstances. Nevertheless, it was exacerbated by public statements
(including those by President Obama) referring to BP as "British
Petroleum ' 133 despite the fact that BP dropped that name in favor of
plain "BY' several years earlier. 34 The public perception of BP as a
British company was likely furthered by the fact that BP's PR firm
was British rather than American. 135 It is possible the British PR firm
failed to appreciate fully the subtle nuances that would have been
necessary to minimize the strength with which Americans categorized
the firm as "outgroup." And the perception of BP as outgroup led the
American public to question its commitment to expend the resources
necessary to fix the problem.
130. Both sides of the Atlantic apparently evoked nationalism because British public opinion
harshly criticized President Obama's actions as targeting British pensioners (who own BP stock).
See Louise Armistead & Myra Butterworth, Barack Obama's Attacks on BP Hurting British
Pensioners, TELEGRAPH (London), June 9, 2010, httpJ/www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
barackobama/7815713/Barack-Obamas-attacks-on-BP-hurting-British-pensioners.html.
131. See JOHN A. WAGNER & JOHN R. HOLLENBECK, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: SECURING
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 314-16 (2010).
132. See id. at 315.
133. See Anushka Asthana, Toby Helm & Julia Kollewe, Gulf Oil Spill: Barack Obama and
David Cameron Move to End Rift Over BP, THE GUARDIAN, June 13, 2010, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/environment/2010/jun/13/gulf-oil-spil.
134. Id.
135. See Tom Bergin, BP PR Blunders Carry High Political Cost, REUTERS UK ONUNE, June
29, 2010, http Jfuk reuters.com/article/201/06/29/uk-oil-spil-bp-pr-idUKTRE65S31T20100629.
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Company spokesman blunders were not limited to Hayward,
however. On June 16, 2010, BP company officials met with President
Obama at the White House where BP agreed to set up the $20 billion
compensation fund to help ameliorate the ecological and economic
losses along the Gulf Coast. 136 Although Hayward was present at this
meeting, he took a back seat to BP's chairman of the board, Carl-
Henric Svanberg, 137 perhaps as a result of his PR troubles. President
Obama held a press conference announcing the fund, and he spoke
about the need to help the small business owners, fishermen, and
shrimpers who had been affected by the spill.138 Thereafter, Svanberg
stepped up to a microphone outside of the White House to deliver his
own statements to the press. In addition to setting up the fund, the
company decided to suspend its quarterly dividend payments to make
sure that there were sufficient corporate funds to pay for the harm
caused by the oil spill. The two announcements should have made for
a very successful PR day for BP, but instead Svanberg's press
statements caused further trouble. Svanberg attempted to assure the
American people that the company appreciated and would respond to
the plight of those whose livelihood had been harmed, and he
attempted to express an appreciation for President Obama's concern
for the people along the Gulf Coast who had been put out of work. He
failed. With his thick Swedish accent, Svanberg said, "We care about
the small people. I hear comments sometimes that large oil companies
are greedy or don't care. But that is not the case at BP. We care about
the small people."1 39
The American public misunderstood Svanberg's comments.
Svanberg later attempted to apologize, emphasizing the fact that
English was not his native language and that his good intentions were
lost in translation,1 40 but the damage was already done. Like
Hayward, Svanberg made statements that the public heard as
separating out BP and its representatives from its victims along
136. See Hall, supra note 115.
137. See Alice Gomstyn, Embattled BP ChiefHayward Taking Back Seat in Gulf Response, ABC NEWS,
June 18, 201(Q http://abcnews.go.com/Business/embattled-bp-chief-hayward-taking-back-seat-
gulf/story?id=10954568.
138. See Tim Webb & Tim Hill, BP to Pay Out $20bn Over Oil Spill After Obama Meeting,
THE GUARDIAN, June 16, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment/2010/junL16/bp-20bn-
trust-oil-spill.
139. For a video clip of these statements, see Associated Press, BP Chief: "We Care About the
Small People, "YOUTUBE (June 16, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-th3LtLxOIEM.
140. See Associated Press, BP's Carl-Henric Svanberg: I Care About Small People,
TELEGRAPH.COMAU (June 17, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/breaking-
news/bps-carl-henric-svanberg-i-care-about-small-people/story-e6freuyi- 1225880758839 (BP
spokesman Tony Odone labeled Svanberg's remarks a "slip in translation").
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socioeconomic-class lines.14' His accent further reminded the
American public that BP was a foreign company. BP's public
announcement of the compensation fund and the suspension of
dividend payments worked to raise the trading price of the company's
stock shares, 142 but it is possible that the demands of those injured
along the coast grew as a result of these comments.
It seems that BP eventually recognized that it needed a public
face with whom Americans could identify. On June 16, 2010, nearly
two months after the Macondo well explosion, BP announced that
Managing Director Robert Dudley, an American, would take over the
company's response to the crisis. 143 BP also ran several television ads
with company spokespeople who stated that they grew up along the
Gulf Coast and considered the affected waters and beaches to be their
home. 144 Each gave their pledge that BP would not rest until it undid
the harm. Hayward gave the same pledges months earlier, but
somehow these casually dressed, down-to-earth, local American
citizens were able to deliver that message much more credibly.
145
IV. CONCLUSION
As of December 31, 2010, BP was conducting operations in 29
countries, marketing its products in more than 70 countries, and
employing 79,700 workers.1 46 With those numbers, it could surely
target employees to deliver effective apologies and to handle the
company's PR. What BP missed was an understanding about how
those speaking for them can give off subtle messages that solidify (or
break down) the sense that the company belongs in the outgroup for
victims and the public generally. Perhaps BP missed the fact that,
although it is a global corporation that has successfully broken
through national barriers, deep in our human brains lies a capability
141. See Clarence Page, Big Oil, 'Small People,' CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2010, at 21, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-20/news/ct-oped-0620page-20100620_ 1-big-oil-gulf-of-
mexico-oil-small-people.
142. See Jill Schlesinger, Pre-Market Glimpse. BP Takes Center Stage, CBS NEWS, June 17,
2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_ 162-20008002-503983.html?tag=contentMain
;contentBody.
143. See Gomstyn, supra note 137.
144. See, for example, BP Oil Spill-Official BP Response Video for Oil Spill Claims,
YoUTUBE (June 14, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-7w8Aw5Byis8, for a video of one
such commercial.
145. The fact that the U.S. Coast Guard played such an active role likely helped to allay
concerns that the leak would not be stopped and remedied, but it likely did little to restore public
attitudes toward BP itself.
146. Key Facts and Figures, BP.COM, http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?
categoryId=9021229&contentId=7039276 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
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for national pride that, if triggered, can generate hostility toward
those perceived to be from other nations. A highly profitable company
finds itself on the hook whenever its actions cause damage, regardless
of fault. Add to this situation a perception of fault and the cost to the
company grows, both in terms of liability costs and future regulatory
burdens. But add in botched PR that increase the sense that the
company belongs to an outgroup relative to those who sit in judgment
of it, and the liability and future regulatory hurdles likely rise even
further.1
47
With the very rapid rise of international commerce, many
companies operate across several national borders. 148 Moreover, in the
last few decades the income disparity between corporate executives
and ordinary citizens has increased.149 When a company is doing well,
the public loses sight of these differences in favor of superordinate
goals like prosperity and technological improvements. But when
disaster strikes, or difficult times place companies and their
executives in a position of conflict or competition with a nation's
citizenry, then the public judges the company's conduct more severely.
That severe judgment can cost a company more than necessary in
terms of liabilities, human capital, and future regulatory burdens. The
latter can affect all the other companies in the industry because new
regulations applicable to an entire industry often follow public outrage
stemming from one company's disaster. In order to dampen public
outrage, there may be an industry-wide interest in effective corporate
apologies.
147. A desire to punish does not typically motivate regulatory burdens per se, but the public
push for the government to intervene with enhanced regulations is likely stronger with greater
public outrage, and how the company handles the PR surrounding the disaster can significantly
affect the degree and duration of public outrage.
148. See generally Klaus E. Meyer, Ram Mudambi & Rajneesh Narula, Multinational
Enterprises and Local Contexts: The Opportunities and Challenges of Multiple Embeddedness, 48
J. MGMT. STUD. 235 (2011).
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We need to know more about how outgroup biases influence
receptions to apologies. Remorse is likely a universally expressed
phenomenon, but what are the subtle differences in how members of
different groups display cues to sincerity? How do those differences
affect the likely success of apologetic gestures? Even if there are no
systematic differences in expressions of remorse, are victims and other
audience members simply more skeptical of the sincerity and import
of such gestures? And, if so, can exaggerated or otherwise altered
apology efforts mollify those concerns? BP's handling of the Macondo
oil spill suggests that these are important questions deserving of
further exploration.

